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SUMMARY 
 
This essay is a preliminary research note on “Security Sector Reform (SSR)” as part of 
peacebuilding in African countries. It looks at the cases of UN peacekeeping missions in 
Africa and identifies elements of SSR in them. First of all, this essay starts with 
recalling UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan’s Report in 1998 on conflict causes in 
Africa, while arguing that the theoretical foundation of SSR in Africa was prepared in 
the Report. Next, the essay summarizes the record of SSR related UN peacekeeping 
missions in Africa and finds that its elements evolved conspicuously after 1997, the year 
Annan became the Secretary-General. The essay then focuses on the case of the UN 
mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is the largest UN 
peacekeeping mission at the moment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) means a set of security related reforms conducted upon 
public authorities for the purpose of peacebuilding. As peace operations expanded in 
quantity and quality, measures to improve security situations are regarded to be more 
important than ever. Usually it takes the form of reforms on the military, the police and 
the judiciary. Some other activities like DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration) are also often understood to be components of SSR, although there are 
no established criterion to demarcate what falls into SSR and what does not.1
 The main purpose of this essay is not to examine the definition of SSR. Rather, 
the essay explores the way SSR has been conducted in Africa in order to see actual uses 
of SSR on the ground. The reason why this essay focuses on Africa is not simply 
because a majority of recent peacekeeping missions have been taking place there. It is 
also because security issues are so critical in Africa that experimental measures of SSR 
have been attempted and developed. 
 It must be noted that this essay is still a preliminary product of the author’s 
ongoing research on SSR. This only identifies the recent trend of SSR in Africa. Further 
examinations remain to be seen in future works. This essay seeks to find and provide a 
useful clue to more studies on SSR in the context of peacebuilding.  
 
2. UN Secretary-General’s Report in 1998 
 
In order to look at the context of SSR as part of peacebuilding in Africa, it is useful to 
recall the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, issued in 1998 
under the title of “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and 
Sustainable Development in Africa.” Annan became the UN Secretary-General in the 
previous year as the first SG from sub-Saharan African countries. Prior to the 
appointment, he had been the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 
experienced bitter failures of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, notably in Somalia 
and Rwanda. His Report on Africa in 1998 was widely recognized as a milestone work, 
which could be made possible only by a UN Secretary-General like Annan. 
 Annan rather candidly analyzed the situation in which armed conflicts erupted 
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quite often in Africa. He stated that in addition to the colonial legacies, many African 
countries had only fragile state mechanisms. He remarked that “Where there is 
insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate 
checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to 
change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control 
becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high. This situation 
is exacerbated when, as is often the case in Africa, the State is the major provider of 
employment and political parties are largely either regionally or ethnically based. In 
such circumstances, the multi-ethnic character of most African States makes conflict 
even more likely, leading to an often violent politicization of ethnicity. In extreme cases, 
rival communities may perceive that their security, perhaps their very survival, can be 
ensured only through control of State power.”2  
 Namely, Annan unequivocally pointed out that while there were external 
factors behind the scenes of armed conflicts in Africa, there were also internal causes of 
conflict within African states. Thus, one conclusion drawn from this observation is clear. 
In order to prevent another conflict from occurring again and in order to eradicate 
conflict causes for the purpose, it is indispensable to improve internal governmental 
mechanisms. 
 Annan identified “post-conflict peacebuilding” as “actions undertaken at the 
end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed 
confrontation.”3 According to him, in order to achieve this goal, traditional means of 
peacekeeping in the military and diplomatic fields are not sufficient. He explained that 
“Peace-building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, 
monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and 
rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development.” Thus, 
peacebuilding is a new kind of activities for the purpose of creating new peaceful 
societies. He continued that “Peace-building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and 
development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build on, add 
to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of 
conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, 
reconstruction and recovery.” 4
 His standpoint was evident, since he stressed that “The crucial underlying need 
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in post-conflict peace-building situations is the security of ordinary people, in the form 
of real peace and access to basic social facilities.”5 It is often claimed in the field of 
peacebuilding that there will be no effective effort for reconstruction without security. 
Anann unequivocally proclaimed that security must come first and thus UN efforts for 
peace would be organized on the basis of the observation. 
 In order to build durable peace, Annan emphasized the importance of “good 
governance,” which is a logical extension of his argument on conflict causes. He then 
illustrated four pivotal areas under the heading of “good governance,” namely, 
“securing respect for human rights and the rule of law,” “promoting transparency and 
accountability in public administration,” “enhancing administrative capacity,” and 
“strengthening democratic governance.”6 All these are intrinsically connected to each 
other. They point to the simple fact that we must pursue reliable public authorities or 
state mechanism in particular that are responsible for healthy governance immune from 
political abuses, if we want to achieve durable peace in the region. This position is 
justified for the reason that “the crucial underlying need in post-conflict peace-building 
situations is the security of ordinary people, in the form of real peace and access to basic 
social facilities.” 
 Now, it was recognized that peacebuilding would require reforms in public 
authorities, which would apply to Africa in particular where armed conflicts had been 
rampant. The priority of peacebuilding is the security of ordinary people. Thus, we can 
easily expect that what we should strongly prioritize is the reform in security related 
fields in public authorities. Annan did not use the phrase “SSR” in 1998. He did not 
particularly specify what we nowadays identify as the items of SSR like reforms of a 
national army and a national police. Nevertheless, he showed the logic of the need for 
SSR straightforward, so itemization was just a matter of concrete drafting of his policy 
orientation. 
 
3. Engagements of UN Peacekeeping Mission in Domestic Security Sectors  
 
Annan’s Report, of course, did not come out all of sudden. UN peacekeeping missions 
had been evolving in line with the explanation of Annan in 1998. With the expansion of 
UN peacekeeping missions in quantity and quality throughout 1990’s, there appeared 
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some missions that launched activities directly involved in domestic security 
institutions.7 This section briefly looks at the record in chronological order.8
 
Somalia  
The United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was established in 
accordance with Security Council in March 1993, to take over from the Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF). 9  Its mandate later 10  expanded to include assisting in the 
reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system. 
 
Angola  
The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) was established in June 
1997, following the completion of United Nations Verification Mission in Angola III 
(UNAVEM III). MONUA’s mandate included matters relating to the domestic police 
and national army.11 The civilian police component of MONUA verified the neutrality 
of the Angolan National Police, the incorporation of UNITA (the União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola) personnel into the national police, the quartering and 
occasional deployment of the rapid reaction police; give special attention to respect for 
civil and political rights and freedoms; inspect prisons and, if need be, establish its 
temporary presence at national police posts and stations, monitored and verified the 
collection of weapons recovered from the civilian population; and supervised proper 
storage or destruction of these weapons. The human rights component of MONUA 
helped develop the capacity of national institutions and non-governmental organizations 
in the field of human rights; and investigated adequately allegations of abuses and 
initiate appropriate action. The military component of MONUA monitored the 
integration of UNITA soldiers into the Angola Armed Forces. 
 
Central African Republic  
The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) was 
established in April 1998.12 MINURCA’s initial mandate included assisting the national 
security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in 
Bangui; supervising, controlling storage, and monitoring the final disposition of all 
weapons retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise; assisting in coordination 
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with other international efforts in a short-term police trainers programme and in other 
capacity-building efforts of the national police; and providing advice on the 
restructuring of the national police and special police forces. 
 
Sierra Leone  
The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established in October 
1999. 13  Its mandate included assisting the Government of Sierra Leone in the 
implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan; to that end, 
establishing a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, 
including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres. Its mandate 
later expanded14 to include coordinating with and assisting the Sierra Leone law 
enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
 
Liberia  
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in September 2003.15 
Its mandate includes developing an action plan for the overall implementation of a 
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all 
armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and 
women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants; carrying out 
voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of 
an organized DDRR programme; liaising with the JMC (Joint Monitoring Committee) 
and to advise on the implementation of its functions under the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and the ceasefire agreement; assisting the transitional government of Liberia 
in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic 
policing, developing a police training programme, and otherwise assisting in the 
training of police, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), international organizations, and interested States; assisting the transitional 
government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation 
with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States; assisting the 
transitional Government, in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international 
partners, in reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the 
establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local 
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levels; and assisting the transitional government in conjunction with ECOWAS and 
other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental 
institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional 
institutions. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC) was established in November 1999.16 Its mandate expanded in 200417 to 
include facilitating the demobilization and voluntary repatriation of the disarmed 
foreign combatants and their dependants; contributing to the disarmament portion of the 
national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of 
Congolese combatants and their dependants, in monitoring the process and providing as 
appropriate security in some sensitive locations; security sector reform, including the 
integration of national defence and internal security forces together with disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the 
police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
Côte d’Ivoire  
The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) was established in April 2004, 
following the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) and the forces of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).18 Its mandate includes 
assisting the Government of National Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of 
all the Ivorian forces involved and assisting in ensuring the security of their 
disarmament, cantonment and demobilization sites; supporting the Government of 
National Reconciliation in the implementation of the national programme for the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, paying special attention 
to the specific needs of women and children; coordinating closely with the United 
Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary 
repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign ex-combatants, paying special 
attention to the specific needs of women and children, in support of the efforts of the 
Government of National Reconciliation and in cooperation with the Governments 
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concerned, relevant international financial institutions, international development 
organizations and donor nations; securing, neutralizing or destroying any weapons, 
ammunition or any other military materiel surrendered by the former combatants; 
assisting the Prime Minister of the Government of National Reconciliation in 
formulating and monitoring the implementation of the Joint Operation Plan for the 
disarmament and dismantling of militias envisaged in article 4 of the Pretoria 
Agreement; securing, neutralizing or destroying all weapons, ammunition and other 
military materiel surrendered by militias; assisting the Government of National 
Reconciliation in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international 
organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire, 
advising the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal 
security services, and assisting the Ivorian parties with the implementation of temporary 
and interim security measures in the northern part of the country, as provided for in 
paragraph 6 of the Pretoria Agreement; assisting the Government of National 
Reconciliation in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and other international 
organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law 
throughout Côte d'Ivoire. 
 
Burundi  
The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was established in May 2004.19 Its 
mandate includes collecting and securing weapons and military materiel to dispose of it 
as appropriate, and contributing to the dismantling of militias as called for in the 
ceasefire agreements; carrying out the disarmament and demobilization portions of the 
national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; to 
monitoring the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as 
well as the disarmament and demobilization of the elements that need to be disarmed 
and demobilized; carrying out institutional reforms as well as the constitution of the 
integrated national defence and internal security forces and, in particular, the training 
and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; completing implementation of the reform of 
the judiciary and correction system, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement; 
extending State authority and utilities throughout the territory, including police and 
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judicial institutions, helping the Government of Burundi in carrying out the national 
programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and 
members of their families, including those coming from the territory of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo with particular attention to the specific needs of women and 
children. 
 
Sudan  
The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established in March 2005.20 
Its mandate includes assisting in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration program as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with 
particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its 
implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and 
destruction; assisting the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in 
coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, in restructuring the 
police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police 
training and evaluation program, and to otherwise assist in the training of police; 
assisting the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of 
law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people 
of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating 
impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and assisting the parties to 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal 
framework. 
 
 
Although the most ambitious UN peacekeeping mission in the early 1990’s, 
UNOSOM II, had elements of SSR, they were faint. In addition, UNOSOM II itself 
withdrew in March 1995, just a year after the UN Security Council Resolution 897 
authorized UNOSOM II to “assist in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial 
system.” All the other examples of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa that contained 
elements of SSR were established after 1997, in other words, after Kofi Annan took the 
office of the Secretary-General. We can observe that at least as long as UN 
peacekeeping missions in Africa are concerned, SSR elements of UN peacekeeping 
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missions evolved conspicuously during Annan’s era. 
 
4. The Wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
In order to examine the role of SSR in the context of overall peacebuilding activities in 
an area, we shall now focus on one of the major cases of SSR in UN peacekeeping 
missions in Africa, which is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
 The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo took place following the 
situation of Rwanda after the massacre. At first, under the circumstance in which many 
Rwandan refugees in Zaire (now DRC) were not able to return after 1994, the 
movement of anti-Rwandan worsened in Zaire. With the expectation of the Zairian 
authority’s move to expel Rwandan “Tuti” refugees, 21  Alliance des Forces 
Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) showed an armed uprising 
as a certain kind of “preemptive strike.” AFDL whose chairman is Laurent Desire 
Kabila decided to proceed to the capital, Kinshasa, within a month. In May, 1997, 
AFDL succeeded to overthrow the Mobutu regimes. 
 As Kablila alienated Rwandan influences from DRC, a group supported by 
Rwanda and Uganda began an uprising in August, 1998. Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia 
and Chad militarily intervened on the side of the Kabila regime. As it went on, the war 
became more and more complex due to multiple armed actors and a split between 
Rwanda and Uganda. 
 In July 1999 most conflict-parties joined in the ceasefire agreement in Lusaka, 
Zambia under the pressure from the UN, US, EU and OAU. Those who signed the 
ceasefire agreement confirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC and 
agreed to the need for national conversation and a unified army. At the same time, they 
requested UN peacekeeping forces. Then the UN Security Council adopted the 
Resolution 1258 in August 1999 and dispatched 90 military staff. It decided to assist the 
Joint Military Commission (JMC) which was given the duty of monitoring the Lusaka 
ceasefire agreement. In November, the U.N Security Council decided to establish 
MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) by Resolution 1279. 500 military observers were added. In the following year, 
2000, in February, the dispatch of 5,000 troops was ordered by the Security Council 
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Resolution 1291. However, it took years to actually fulfill this number. The Resolution 
1291 referred to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but the actual mandate was limited to 
the protection of the UN workers, humanitarian aid workers and Congolese people 
around them. The main purpose of MONUC was limited to monitoring the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement. What made the situation more complicated 
was the dissatisfaction of Kabila with the deployment of troops from the West. He 
demanded that the forces should be only from the “Southern” countries.22
 In January, 2001, Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed 
the position of president. Thereafter, peace talks gradually proceeded. In July 2002 
Kabila and the Rwandan government agreed on withdrawing the Rwandan army in 
exchange of cleaning up the Hutu military power in DRC. After the actual withdrawal, 
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia withdrew too. In September, Kabila and the Uganda 
government agreed on the withdrawal of the Ugandan army, which was eventually 
implemented in the following year. In December 2002 the “Pretoria Agreement” was 
made to establish a national government based on the idea of power sharing. 
 A new crisis between the Kabila government and Rwanda came in 2004 due to 
the fragile situation in the eastern part of DRC. The military confrontation was avoided 
after JVC (Joint Verification Commission) was established by DRC and Rwanda. 
MONUC openly started to chase the Hutu armed power from Rwanda in DRC and 
enforced disarmament in 2005.23
 
5. The Engagement of the International Community 
 
What seems to characterize the war in DRC is the insufficient engagement of the 
international community. This is not to blame international efforts for DRC. The number 
of peacekeepers and the amount of the funds invested into DRC are not remarkably high 
in contrast with the seriousness of the situation in the field. But at the same time they 
are not remarkably low either. DRC has about the population of 54 million and its size 
is more than 2.2 million km2. Only the eastern part of DRC constitutes the size of 
France. It is estimated that 3.8 million have lost their lives by hunger, epidemic and 
other indirect damages of war in addition to direct killings since 1998.24 In order to 
respond to the situation of this degree of seriousness, the international community needs 
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to prepare an unrealistically high level of engagement. In real terms this means that the 
engagement of the international community in DRC would have to be low almost 
inevitably. 
 The international community as a result took an attitude of expecting a better 
change in the situation, while abstaining from conducting a robust operation to change it 
compulsorily. The response from the international community to the armed conflicts in 
DRC shows a common pattern often seen in Africa. With the low level of engagement 
of the international community, no remarkable measures against armed conflicts would 
be seen until they get worse. Since neighbor countries are involved in conflicts, local 
organizations like OAU (African Union [AU] since July, 2002) and SADC (Southern 
African Development Community) are not perfectly trust-worthy for mediation. The 
United States and European states make efforts for mediation and the UN Security 
Council regularly adopts resolutions. But they never take robust actions. So UN 
Missions with insufficient capacity must face up to serious armed conflicts. 
 The UN warned against serious violations of human rights in the eastern part of 
DRC in 1998 when the ‘Second Civil War’ broke out.25 The Security Council admitted 
that the armed conflict constituted a threat to regional peace and security.26 The Security 
Council requested the ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign armies by the Resolution 
1234 and it called for an international conference on stability of the entire Great Lakes 
region.27 The Lusaka ceasefire agreement on July 10th 1999 requested the UN for 
monitoring the ceasefire in cooperation with JMC and OAU, continuation of 
humanitarian aid, collection of arms, monitoring withdrawals of foreign armies, 
demilitarization of armed groups, investigations of war criminals and transfer of 
genocide criminals to the International Criminal Court for Rwanda.28 Then the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1258 in August and decided to dispatch 90 military liaison 
workers with other civilian staff.29 And in November MONUC was decided to be 
established.30
 In February 2000 the Security Council decided to dispatch 5,537 troops 
including 500 military observers.31  The Security Council mentioned Chapter VII, 
asking for the withdrawals of the Rwandan Army and the Ugandan Army, in the 
following resolutions. However, it did not intend to increase the size of MONUC.32 The 
Security Council also repeatedly requested cessation of military activities of domestic 
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armed groups as well as Rwanda and Uganda.33 But what MONUC could do was 
limited to the protection of UN or JMC workers, their facilities and the citizens in the 
danger of direct physical violence.34 The report regarding the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources in DRC was submitted in 2001,35 but the Security Council did not take 
appropriate measures to resolve the problem. 
 It was in the late 2003 when a crisis occurred in Bunia in May 2003 that the 
Security Council gave the Chapter VII enforcement authority to the Interim Emergency 
Multinational Force for the purpose of maintenance of public peace with all necessary 
means.36 When the Multinational Force succeeded in keeping stability in the region, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1493 to ask member states to impose arms 
embargo upon armed groups in Kivu and Ituri provinces.37
 With the Resolution 1533 in March 2004, the Security Council finally gave 
MONUC a Chapter VII authority to collect arms from armed groups compulsorily.38 
Moreover, the Security Council authorized the activity of professional groups to verify 
the inflow routes of arms under Chapter VII.39 The Council asked MONUC to bring the 
number of troops up to 17,175 with Resolution 1565 and confirmed that MONUC could 
take all the necessary means to implement its mandate. 
 It was in October 2004 that MONUC was given a new mandate to provide 
advice and support to the government about SSR and elections.40 As the mandate 
became more active, there appeared a momentum for MONUC to be engaged in SSR 
activities. 
 The plan to increase peacekeepers gradually was explained that it was for 
pressing the will of the parties as well as for securing the safety of the UN personnel.41 
This careful attitude had some political considerations which reflected the crisis of UN 
peacekeepers in Sierra Leone in 2000.42
 But the approach of the international community entered into a new stage, 
when a power sharing government was established. The international community began 
to distinguish between the legitimate political parties and other non-legitimate ones. 
Then, the UN judged that there was an opportunity to make progress even with stronger 
means and decided to give more forces and more robust authorities to MONUC. 
However, it is worth recalling that Kofi Annan had proposed to increase the number of 
troops up to 23,000 before the Resolution 1565 was adopted. The Security Council cut it 
 - 167 -
down. 
 In response to the war in DRC, the international community took the measure 
of traditional ceasefire monitoring. However, when the ceasefire agreement was 
concluded, it is obvious that more positive peacebuilding activities were required. SSR 
began to be implemented in the context. 
 
6. SSR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had a plan of disarming and 
demobilizing the Zairian army. The first phase was to give priority to children as well as 
handicapped or elderly people for the purpose of social re-integration. The second phase 
was to seriously aim at the re-integration of old soldiers.43 In 2001 the political 
committee at the cabinet minister level which was established as a result of the Lusaka 
ceasefire agreement presented the concept of disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration, repatriation and resettlement (DDRRR) and proposed that the UN should 
be responsible for the execution.44 However, MONUC had been preparing only for a 
gradual increase in its size and even lacked necessary information on disarmament.45
 Though UNICEF had started their relief program for the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, MONUC finally started working on 
DDRRR in 2002.46 According to the plan, the government of DRC would conduct 
disarmament and MONUC would cover demobilization and reintegration. Also, 
UNHCR planed to support repatriation of family members of ex-soldiers and WHO 
planed to give medical support.47 MONUC established the first DDRRR center in 
Lubero, the north Kivu in December 2002 and conducted disarmament of Rwandan 
soldiers.48 The initial progress of disarmament was not remarkable. For example, 
MONUC and UNDP supported the disarmament and community reintegration programs 
of 15,000 soldiers in Ituri region under the initiative of the transitional government, but 
only 1,500 people actually responded.49
 MONUC started the training for the local Congolese police officers by the 
civilian policemen and also election support, judicial reform and SSR.50 It was 2004 
that MONUC recognized SSR as its major activity. With the initiative of the UN 
Headquarters, MONUC held a meeting regarding SSR with supporting countries and 
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started the SSR Coordination Committee in July 2004. The Committee consisted of 
MONUC personnel and specialists of SSR recommended by the British government.51
 The Security Council Resolution 1565 approved the establishment of a 
committee which the government and MONUC would organize in order to support SSR 
by the transitional government.52 And the disarmament-related activity called DDRRR 
was changed to DDR which is a more general expression and now recognized as part of 
SSR.53 As for SSR the governments of Great Britain, France and South Africa showed 
interests and offered support in cooperation with MONUC. For example, the French 
government had interest in the police reform and started the training of 500 Rapid 
Intervention Police Unit.54 South Africa started a reform of the national army in 
cooperation with Belgium at the end of 2004.55
 The “neutral force,” which consisted of 900 military personnel to protect the 
members of the transitional government in Kinshasa, transferred its duties to the police 
mechanism of the DRC government trained by EU.56 The measures were intended to 
connect the actual activity of MONUC with smooth capacity development of the local 
government.  
 Even when the engagement of the international community was limited, 
peacebuilding can aim at gradual progress with a systematic involvement of local 
society. In other words, the international community can proceed only along the level of 
capacity development of local society. The effort for peacebuilding by the international 
community went to a new phase in 2004, as certain progress of capacity development 
had been made. 
 This section identified that DDR came to assume a very major role in 
peacebuilding in DRC and then SSR was also recognized as a major peacebuilding 
policy. Peacebuilding in DRC advanced disarmament as much as possible, while 
respecting the trust between conflict parties. SSR was pursued as part of peacebuilding 
in order to establish the “rule of law.” Needless to say, the national election in 2006 will 
have a big impact upon the progress of peacebuilding in the future. And then SSR will 
be further advanced. SSR cannot be developed separately from the progress in the peace 
process as a whole. 
 
7. Conclusion 
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 As this essay is a preliminary work on SSR in Africa, it is not appropriate make a final 
conclusion to the observation. However, we have found that SSR elements in peace 
operations in Africa have evolved in a significant way since Kofi Annan took the 
position of the UN Secretary-General. The theoretical background of this move was 
explained concisely in his Report on conflict causes in 1998. By referring to the case of 
DRC, we have also identified that the gradual advancement of peace operations at a 
certain stage reaches the point of strengthening a peace-process-made central 
government. Then SSR comes to the agenda table almost naturally. 
Further detailed analyses are not possible without looking at each specific case 
of peacebuilding. But at least we can conclude that SSR has been solidly located in the 
recent doctrine of peacebuilding and actually advanced in many spots of Africa. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 The United Nations usually does not include “DDR” or judicial reform in the category of “SSR.” 
But in Afghanistan where five “lead nations” took primary responsibility in one separate field under 
the theme of “SSR,” Japan became the lead nation in the field of “DDR” and Italy in the field of 
judicial reform. The United States took responsibility in creating the National Army, while the 
United Kingdom became the lead nation in the field of anti-narcotics and Germany in the police 
reform. 
2 See United Nations, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable 
Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General,” 13 April 1998, UN Document, A/52/871 – 
S/1998/318, para. 12. 
3 Ibid., para. 63. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., paras 71-78. 
7 The mission to observe a ceasefire is within the traditional framework of UN peacekeeping. So this 
essay does not recognize such activities as an engagement in domestic security institutions and 
therefore excludes them from the list presented in this section. 
8 In identifying the year of initiating activities concerned here, this essay refers to the date of the 
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